




Symbolic power and mathematics
Skovsmose, Ole
Published in:




Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Skovsmose, O. (2011). Symbolic power and mathematics. In R. Bhatia (Ed.), Plenary Lectures and Ceremonies
(Vol. 1, pp. 690-705). World Scientific.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 29, 2020
Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians
Hyderabad, India, 2010




Symbolic power will be discussed with reference to mathematics. Two distinc-
tions are pointed out as crucial for exercising such power: one between appear-
ance and reality, and one between sense and reference. These distinctions in-
clude a nomination of what to consider primary and what to consider secondary.
They establish the grammatical format of a mechanical and formal world view.
Through an imposition of such world views symbolic power is exercised through
mathematics.
This power is further investigated through different dimensions of math-
ematics in action: (1) Technological imagination which refers to the possi-
bility of formulating technical possibilities. (2) Hypothetical reasoning which
addresses consequences of not-yet realised technological initiatives. (3) Legit-
imation or justification which refers to possible validations of technological
actions. (4) Realisation which signifies that mathematics itself comes to con-
stitute part of reality. And (5) dissolution of responsibility, which may occur
when issues of responsibility are eliminated from the discourse about techno-
logical initiatives and their implications. Finally, it is emphasised that whatever
form symbolic power may take, it cannot be addressed along a single good-evil
axis.
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1. Symbolic Power
Symbolic power is not a well-defined notion, yet it has been used in many
contexts1. Symbolic power can be exercised through discourses which impose a
range of priorities and implicit notions on that which is being addressed2.
Symbolic power can be exercised by way of labelling, for instance by singling
out particular groups of people. One can refer to immigrants when trying to
shed light on street violence; blacks when addressing poverty in Africa; slow
learners when trying to explain certain educational problems. In fact there is
a close correlation between designating and an imposition of stereotypes. A
language can operate as an instrument of simplification; one may think of the
language developed around production efficiency. Such a language may refer to
workers, but stripped of their human relationships, instead highlighting them as
more of less efficient elements of a production machinery. Symbolic power can
be exercised through concepts like “soul”, “God”, “salvation” just to mention
some designations that includes layers of metaphysical assumptions. The dis-
cussion of symbolic power can refer to any form of discourse and to any form of
language.
Rudolf Carnap found that one could get rid of all the misunderstandings and
preconceptions that have been instilled in natural language by constructing for-
mal languages3. In this way science would have a true universal formal format.
Thus Carnap envisioned formal languages as liberators from the illegitimate
power exercised by natural language.
2. Mathematics and Symbolic Power
A formal language is also a language, and as such it may exercise symbolic
power. One can discuss, then, to what extent the symbolic power connected
to formal languages is benevolent, or if it might be questionable, illegitimate,
and suspicious. In fact a formal language might not be a liberator as assumed
by Carnap. It might be the bearer of a power that is in need of being both
identified and criticize; it might bring along with it heavy loads of metaphysical
assumptions. In fact, it is possible for symbolic power to have the same huge
range of qualities that can be associated to power in general.4 It could be
problematic, unfair, blind, helpful, ruthless, benevolent, etc.
I do not assume that the notion of mathematics can be captured in any
single definition. Instead I find that mathematics can take many different forms,
1See, for instance, Bourdieu (1991). For a discussion of knowledge and power, see Foucault
(1989, 1994, 2000).
2Several philosophers, from Nietzsche (1998) via Carnap (1959) to iek (2008) has formu-
lated a heavy critique of the power exercised by language.
3See Carnap (1937).
4I use the notion of “quality” in a classic philosophical way as referring to “property”,
and not to some degree of desirability.
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such as making a budget, calculating a salary, making an investment, reading
a map, completing a design, solving school mathematics exercises, solving an
engineering problem, not to forget doing mathematical research. One can see
mathematics as a language, as a discourse. In fact one can see it as an extended
family of discourses that involve different degrees of formalism.
I will discuss symbolic power with reference to this extended family of lan-
guages in two steps: (1) One can see mathematics as a descriptive tool. However,
there are no neutral descriptions. Any description includes priorities with re-
spect to what to include and what to exclude. Also mathematics-based descrip-
tions exercise symbolic power by nominating what to call primary and what to
call secondary. (2) One can see mathematics as making part of actions, and I
will explore this dimension of symbolic power by addressing different features
of mathematics in action. Together the discussion of (1) and (2) will illustrate
how I associate symbolic power to mathematics.5
3. What Is Primary and what Is Secondary?
We can imagine that symbolic power can be exercised through the invention of
something that is not already the case. It appears that by applying mathemat-
ics one can invent measures, norms, and standards that were not really there
before the mathematical discourse nominated the entities to be addressed. One
can also assume that symbolic power manifests as the systematic overlooking
of particular groups of phenomena. Thus, we can search for symbolic power by
examining priorities for both “seeing” and “overlooking”. Such priorities can
be imprinted in the grammar (or the structure) of language, and also of formal
languages. Symbolic structuring provides a way of nominating something as pri-
mary and other things as secondary. Such a grammar-based primary-secondary
ranking makes up one layer of a language-instilled metaphysics.
In order to clarify further the primary-secondary ranking, I will consider
two distinctions that can be associated with mathematics. One distinction is
related to the formulation of the mechanical world view, while the other is
related to the formulation of what I refer to as the formal world view.6 By
paying attention to these two distinctions, I try to point out two features of
symbolic power that can be associated to mathematics.
3.1. Appearance and reality. Through the scientific revolution an
intimate relationship between mathematics and the natural sciences was
5This applies to all different forms of mathematics, and also to the different forms of
ethnomathematics. In the following, however, I will concentrate on what can be referred to
as academic mathematics, in particular as it is realised through its applications.
6For a discussion of these two distinctions see Skovsmose (2009). See also Skovsmose (2005)
for a discussion of mathematics and power. My work with these distinctions is inspired by
my cooperation with Ole Ravn, see Skovsmose and Ravn (draft).
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established. This relationship, however, was only made possible through the
distinction between appearance and reality. The establishment of the heliocen-
tric world view illustrates clearly what this distinction is about. Looking at
the sun in the morning, one sees how it rises in the sky. During the course of
the day one can follow its movements. In the evening we can see the beautiful
colours of the western sky, when it sinks below the horizon. Literature is awash
with variations of sunrise-sunset descriptions. Let us imagine that we were to
collect all these descriptions and from them try to extract an insight into the
sunrise-sunset phenomenon. According to the scientific revolution, we would
never attain any insight at all, as we would remain trapped by the appear-
ance of the phenomenon. At the heart of the formulation of the heliocentric
world view is the assumption that one needs to get around the appearances of
phenomena in order to grasp the structures of reality.
The distinction between appearance and reality has been emphasised by
many. However, I will refer to a particular text by Galileo Galilei as paradig-
matic for formulating the appearance-reality distinction. In The Assayer, first
published in 1623, Galilei discusses the notion of heat7 We all have experiences
of this phenomenon. One may be burned by the rays of the sun, touch a warm
kettle, come too close to a fire, gulp a spoonful of too hot soup, etc. One could
try to register a broad variety of experiences with heat and on this basis try
to formulate an insight as to what heat really is. Galilei’s point is that such
an approach brings us nowhere: our experiences of heat do not reveal anything
about the real nature of heat. The “mechanics” of heat, according to Galilei, is
very different from whatever might be gleaned from of our sense experiences,
just as the mechanism of sunrise and sunset is different from our experiences
of these phenomena. According to Galilei, to provoke an experience of heat
“nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or
rapid movements” (Galilei 1957: 276–277).
The mechanical world view presents reality as a tremendous mechanism
composed of material units, characterised by their shape, number and move-
ments, governed by certain laws. Such a mechanism is behind experienced
phenomena like heat as well as sunsets. It is behind any of our experiences.
The appearance-reality distinction facilitates the formulation of the mechani-
cal world-view and brings mathematics into a prominent position: it becomes
the principal tool for describing reality. While natural language is useful for
expressing experiences, mathematics is capable of depicting the underlying re-
ality. It does so in terms of shapes, numbers and movements in other words:
in terms of a mechanism.
If we assume that reality is in fact a mechanical structure, then mathemat-
ics can be assigned a tremendous descriptive power: it turns out to be not only
necessary but also sufficient for grasping reality. If we think of this descriptive
7The Assayer is reprinted in Galilei (1957: 229-280). See also Skovsmose (2009) for a
discussion of The Assayer.
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power as a form of symbolic power, the whole outlook of the scientific revo-
lution would bring us to celebrate the symbolic power of mathematics. This
celebration has brought about the claim that mathematics is the language of
sciences; it is the universal symbolism of knowledge. However, if we do not
consider the mechanical world as a given to be discovered, but rather as in-
vented, then we reach quite a different interpretation of this symbolic power.
The mechanical reality is not described by means of mathematics but rather es-
tablished through mathematics as a projection of the grammar of mathematics,
which seems designated to talk about entities like shape, number, movements,
etc. The mechanical world view is due to the way mathematics nominates cer-
tain phenomena as primary and ignores others as secondary. The mechanical
world view can be seen as a frightening metaphysics rooted in the grammar of
mathematics. Thus the mechanical world view becomes a demonstration of a
symbolic power associated with mathematics. Through applications of mathe-
matics the mechanical world view becomes imposed not only on nature, but on
any domain that is mathematised: business, management, forms of production,
marketing, etc.
3.2. Sense and reference. While in The Assayer, Galilei formulated a
distinction between appearance and reality, Gottlob Frege, in Über Sinn und Be-
deutung, first published in 1892, formulated a distinction between sense (Sinn)
and reference (Bedetung).8 The distinction between appearance and reality is
linked to the scientific revolution, while the distinction between sense and ref-
erence can be linked to a formal revolution. Both distinctions specify what is
to be considered primary and what secondary. While the distinction between
appearance and reality concerns our perception of nature and physical environ-
ment, the distinction between sense and reference concerns our perception of
logic and rationality. Frege sought to grasp the nature of logical reasoning.
To illustrate the distinction between sense and reference we can look at
the notion of a triangle. In order to indicate the sense of the word triangle,
one could try to explain that we are dealing with a geometric figure composed
of three straight lines. If, however, one were to indicate the reference of the
concept “triangle”, one would look to the set of all triangles. As Frege was a
Platonist, he would see the reference as the collection of ideal objects. More
generally, the reference of a concept is the set of objects that “fall under” that
concept.
Frege also applies the distinction between sense and reference to statements.
If we state that “the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180◦”, then one could try
to clarify the sense of that sentence, maybe by showing some of the steps in the
proof of the statement. The sense of the statement has to do with the content
of what is stated. However, according to Frege, the reference of the statement
8Über Sinn und Bedeutung is reprinted in Frege (1969: 40-65). See also Skovsmose (2009)
for a discussion of Über Sinn und Bedeutung.
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is something quite different. He suggests that the reference of a statement is
its truth value. Furthermore, he assumes that there are only two such values:
“true” (or T) and “false” (or F). This means that the reference of the statement
“the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180◦” is “true”. If we were to consider all
possible statements, they would have lots of different senses, but their references
would be either “true” or “false”. The domain of references of sentences would
be a very small universe, namely consisting of only two objects, the two possible
truth values, “true” and “false”.
Such a claim may appear absurd. However, it makes it possible for Frege to
formulate his main point: in order to clarify the reality of logical reasoning, one
needs to concentrate on the domain of references of concepts and statements.
References can be considered primary, while senses are secondary and can be
ignored. In fact, when it comes to logical investigation, the dimension of sense
only confuses analysis.9
The distinction between sense and reference has also been expressed in terms
of intension and extension, corresponding to sense and reference. Thus, the ex-
tension of a concept is the set of objects that fall under the concept, while the
intension can be understood as its sense. The extension of a statement is its
truth value, while its intention refers to the content of what is stated. With this
terminology Frege’s claim is that the logical aspects of language are located in
the domain of extensions, while the intentional aspects are carriers of psycho-
logical aspects. If one wants to grasp the reality of logical reasoning, one has
to focus on the extensional aspects of language.10 If one pays attention to the
intentional aspects, one might get bewildered by the appearance of rationality.
This appearance may reveal just as little about logic as the experience of heat
reveals about movements of molecules, or as the beauty of sunrise and sunset
reveals about the rotation of the Earth.11
Frege’s apparently absurd idea paved the way for a tremendous development
of formal systems, formalisations of deduction, automation of reasoning and
for the proliferation of formal languages, including all variations of computer
languages. Frege’s ranking of primary and secondary with respect to logical
reasoning is crucial for the development of artificial intelligence. It is crucial for
establishing any automatic manipulation of formal systems.
9According to Frege, many have suffered such confusion. Mill, for instance, who found
that in order to understand both the nature of logical reasoning and the foundation of math-
ematics, one had to grasp their inductive origin. See Mill’s presentation in A System of Logic
and Frege’s harsh critique of Mill in The Foundation of Arithmetic.
10Frege’s idea was nicely condensed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, where he presented
a truth-table logic.
11An important step towards giving logic an extensional format was presented by Frege in
his Begriffschrift, which was published in 1879. Later Frege provided a new careful elaboration
of formal logic in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, which appeared in two volumes in 1893 and
1903. Many studies have followed, and Whitehead’s and Russell’s Principia Mathematica,
published in three volumes in 1910-1913, reworked many of Frege’s ideas and established a
more powerful symbolism than the one originally suggested by Frege.
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However, one need not assume that the distinction between sense and ref-
erence reveals a basic reality of logical rationality. One may instead consider
the possibility that the sense-reference distinction is imposed on the domain
of investigation. It might be a proposal for implementing a primary-secondary
ranking within the domain of logic. The ranking may represent a profound
metaphysics with respect to rationality. Maybe a new logic is not discovered
through the sense-reference distinction, so much as a new logic is created and
brought into action. We might be dealing with an imposition that represents
symbolic power. And this symbolic power is exercised with respect to all the dif-
ferent domains within business, management, forms of production, marketing,
etc.— taken into custody by automatic manipulations for formal systems.
4. Mathematics in Action
Symbolic power connected to mathematics reaches beyond any primary-
secondary imposition. It is manifested in mathematics-based actions. In this
section I will illustrate the range of mathematics-based actions within tech-
nology. I use “technology” as an almost all-embracing concept referring to any
form of design and construction (of machines, artefacts, tools, robots, automatic
processes, networks, etc.) decision-making (concerning management, promo-
tion, economy, etc.), and organisation (with respect to production, surveillance,
communication, money-processing, etc.).
Like any action, so also a mathematics-based action can be described in
general terms, and I will point out some of its dimensions: (1) Any action
includes visions about what could be done, and by technological imagination
I refer to the tentative formulation of technological possibilities. (2) As part
of investigating a possible action, hypothetical reasoning is important. Through
such reasoning one addresses consequences of not-yet-realised technological con-
structions and initiatives. Through an if-then reasoning one tries to estimate
how feasible it might be to carry out an action. (3) An action may require
justification. Some such justification may take place before one carries out the
action, although one can also try to justify actions after their completion. In
many ways, justification might take the form of a questionable legitimisation.
(4) When completed, an action comes to make part of reality, and realisation
of mathematics refers to the fact that mathematics itself may come to make
part of reality. (5) One can think of an acting person as being responsible for
the action. However, in many examples of mathematics-based actions, it is not
easy to identify an acting subject, and a dissolution of responsibility might
occur.12
12For presentations and discussions of mathematics in action see Skovsmose (2005, 2009);
Skovsmose and Yasukawa (2009); Christensen and Skovsmose (2007); Christensen, Skovsmose
and Yasukawa (2007); Skovsmose, Yasukawa and Ravn (draft); and Skovsmose and Ravn
(draft). The following presentation of mathematics in action draws on this material.
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4.1. Technological imagination. Often technological imagination is
mathematics - based. As a paradigmatic example, one can think of the concep-
tualisation of the computer. The mathematical construct, in terms of the Turing
machine was investigated in every detail.13 Even the computational limits of
the computer were worked out before the construction of the first computer had
taken place. If we consider the computational approach in all its dimensions, we
can talk about the formal revolution, and this revolution is directly related to
the sense-reference distinction. Algorithmic procedures which could be handled
mechanically were related to the extensional aspect of language.14
All features of modern information and communication technology are
deeply rooted in mathematics-based imagination. To illustrate: great potential
for cryptography was identified through mathematical clarifications of number-
theoretical properties. Of particular importance was the identification of what
could be referred as a one-way function This is a function, f , where it is easy to
calculate y = f(x), when x is given, but impossible in any feasible way to cal-
culate f1(y), when only f and y are given.15 The straightforward calculation of
y from the value of x can be associated with encryption, and breaking the code,
i.e. calculating x from the value of y, remains impossible.16 In this way a mathe-
matical construct, a one-way function, provided new technological possibilities.
There is no commonsense-based imagination equivalent to mathematics-based
imagination. Furthermore, it must be noted that mathematics-based imagina-
tion operates beyond any scheme of prediction; instead it brings about contin-
gencies as a characteristic feature of technological development.
Mathematics-based technological imagination plays a crucial role in econ-
omy and business, for instance in establishing schemes for prices and payment
of goods. We can take air-fares as an example: airlines deliberately overbook as
one element of such schemes.17 The overbooking is carefully planned; in par-
ticular, the degree to which a flight can be overbooked needs to be estimated
from the statistics of the numbers of no-shows for the departures in question.
13See, Turing (1965) as well as Skovsmose (2009) for a discussion for this example.
14It is worth noting that intensional logic has developed tremendously, for instance through
the work of Montague (1974), who was keen to develop a Frege semantics, acknowledging
Frege’s contribution to logic and the analysis of language. Montague demonstrated how ap-
parently intentional features of language could be incorporated in a Frege semantics and,
in this way, provided with an extensional foundation. This insight is crucial for develop-
ing computational linguistic features, and, for instance, for establishing automatic forms of
translation.
15That it is possible to construct one-way functions is based on number theoretical insight,
and in particular on the observation of the extreme complexity of factorising a product of
two very large (say at least 50 digits) unknown prime numbers.
16See Skovsmose and Yasukawa (2009), as well as more general presentations in Schroeder
(1997) and Stallings (1999). See also Diffie and Hellman (1976) for the presentation of the
original idea.
17See Clements (1990). See also Skovsmose (2005) for a discussion of this example. There
is a great amount of papers and comments about the phenomenon of overbooking at the
internet. See for instance “Why do Airlines Overbook Flights” (http://weakonomics.com/
2009/12/29/why-do-airlines-overbook-flights/).
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(A “no-show” refers to a passenger with a valid ticket who does not show up for
the departure.) The costs of bumping a passenger need to be estimated as well.
(“Bumping” a passenger means not allowing a passenger with a valid ticket to
board the plane.) The predictability of a passenger for a particular departure be-
ing a no-show is naturally an important parameter in designing the overbooking
policy. The whole overbooking policy can be mathematically experimented with
until a price-setting is reached that maximises profits, this in turn becoming an
ongoing algorithmic-based process. Mathematics-based technological imagina-
tion is crucial, not only for the construction of new technological artefacts, but
also for the identification of new schemes for, say, production, management,
decision-making, etc. It is an imagination, however, that exists within a certain
space. It is an imagination that assumes the mechanical world view, and it is
an imagination that assumes rationality to be of a certain format.
4.2. Hypothetical reasoning. Hypothetical reasoning is counterfac-
tual, as it is of the form: “if p then q, although p is not the case”. This form of
if-then reasoning is essential to any kind of technological enterprise.
If we do p, what would be the consequence? It is important to address this
question before in fact doing p. In order to carry out any more specific hypo-
thetical reasoning within the domain of technology, mathematics is brought in
action. A mathematical model comes to represent an imagined situation, and
the model becomes the basis for identifying what could be the implications of
doing what was imagined. However, the model-determined implications are just
calculated implications. It is far from obvious what might be the relationship
between such calculated implications and real-life consequences of completing
the technological enterprise. The identification of implications, based on formal
calculations, assumes that the mathematical model adequately represents what
is to be implemented. But this assumption rests upon the mechanical world
view claiming that the primary-secondary distinction imposed by the mathe-
matical format of the model is adequate for identifying implications. In other
words the assumption is that what the model downgrades as secondary is in fact
secondary for identifying implications. However, this is a deeply metaphysical
assumption. It is a questionable assumption that relevant implications are of a
mechanical nature, and can be indentified through formal calculations. Yet this
assumption accompanies any mathematics-based hypothetical reasoning.18
4.3. Legitimation or justification. According to a classic perspec-
tive in philosophy, justification refers to a proper and genuine logical support
of a statement, of a decision, or of an action, while the notion of legitimation
does not include such an assumption. The point of providing a legitimation of
an action might be to make it appear, as if it is justified. When a mathematical
18Risks emerge from the fact that mathematical modelling is, in this way, a technique
for overlooking. The emergence of the risk society is partly due to of the development of
mathematics-based hypothetical reasoning that to mathematics-based actions in general.
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model is brought into effect, it can serve as both a legitimation and a justifica-
tion. It can help to provide priorities, although the basis for doing so might be
obscure.
Let me try to illustrate this with a quotation from an article “The Predator
War” by Jane Mayer in The New Yorker, which addresses US use of unmanned
aircraft which can be used for identifying targets and for launching missiles.
The Pentagon has created formulas to help the military develop a taxonomy
of targets: “A top military expert, who declined to be named, spoke of the
military’s system, saying, ‘There’s a whole taxonomy of targets.’ Some people
are approved for killing on sight. For others, additional permission is needed.
A target’s location enters the equation, too. If a school, hospital, or mosque is
within the likely blast radius of a missile, that too is weighed by a computer
algorithm before a lethal strike is authorized.”19
Although the particular details of such “elaborate formulas” for helping the
military most likely will remain a military secrete, we can speculate about the
kind of rationality that is reflected in the taxonomy of targets. In principle, one
could assume that an automatic connection between the processes of calculation
and the military action has been established. However, according to the article
one should assume that the decision—firing or not firing—is a human decision,
although guided by the taxonomy.
We could imagine that the development of the taxonomy is of a cost-benefit
format. On the benefit side must be counted the importance of the target, and
the likelihood that the target will in fact be eliminated by the strike. But,
most certainly, many other military gains could be considered. The costs of
the action also have to be estimated, which implies a range of parameters to
be considered. First one could think of the death of American soldiers, but as
in this case we are dealing with unmanned aircraft this parameter might not
enter into the cost-calculations. However, the value of the airplane must be
included, although reduced by the rather small likelihood that the plane will
get lost in the operation. The value of the missile fired will clearly represent
a cost. But there are more parameters to consider: non-targeted people might
be killed, and, as pointed out, the target could be located close to schools,
hospitals or mosques. How does a school become “weighted” by a computer
algorithm? Through the number of school children expected killed? Or through
the economic value of such a child? Or perhaps it is not the school children
as such that are valued, but the negative PR the bombing of school might
cause?
The crucial point of cost-benefit analysis is that costs and benefits are mea-
sured by the same units. But which? What is the shared unit for cost and
benefits, encompassing the value of fired missiles, American soldiers, school
19Brian Greer drew my attention to this quotation. See the whole article at: http:
//www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa\ fact\ mayer?currentPage=all See
also Greer (in print).
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children, hospitals, mosques, etc.? One might label the stipulation of shared
units of measurement for cynical equations. Such equations are necessary for
any cost-benefit analysis and for turning a process of decision-making into a
process of calculation. Cynical equations are made possible when a mechanical
world-view is forced on the domain in question. All human matters are nom-
inated “appearance”, while reality is constituted by what might be captured
by mathematics. Originally, the appearance-reality distinction nominates the
mechanical world view with respect to nature. However, when mathematics is
applied to human enterprises, the appearance-reality distinction makes human
matters secondary with respect to the enterprise in question. The “primary”
takes a mechanical format captured by predesigned scales of measurement—and
cynical equations might come to appear both natural and neutral. Cynical equa-
tions stem from the imposed mechanical world view, and they enter smoothly
into the automated procedures for formal manipulations. The formulation of
cynical equations blurs the distinction between legitimisations and justifica-
tions. This not only applies to military action, but to any action—in engineer-
ing, economy, business, administration—where a mathematics-based taxonomy
might provide a suspicious legitimation with a glimmer of justification.
4.4. Realisation. A mathematical model can become part of our envi-
ronment. Our life-world is formed through techniques and practices as well as
through categories and discourses emerging from mathematics in action. Tech-
nology is not something “additional” which we can put aside, as if it were a
simple tool, like a hammer. We live in a technologically structured environment,
a techno-nature. Our life-world is situated in this techno-nature, and we cannot
even imagine what it would mean to eliminate technology from our environ-
ment. Just try to do the subtraction piece by piece. We remove the computer,
the credit card, the TV set, the phone. And we continue by removing medicine,
newspapers, cars, bridges, streets, shoes. We have no idea about what kind
of life-world such a continued subtraction would bring us. In this sense our
life-world is submerged in techno-nature.20
Mathematics is an integral part of both techno-nature and life-world. Thus
computers, credit cards, TV sets, phones, medicine, newspapers, cars, bridges,
streets, and shoes are today produced by means of processes packed with math-
ematics. But not only the objects which make part of our techno-nature are
formatted through mathematics; so are many practices. Mathematics estab-
lishes routines: in production, in business, in all economic affairs, in daily life.
The whole domain of relevant knowledge for decision making at the stock
market—buying or selling—is mathematised and made available through figures
and diagrams. In this way mathematics can provide a highly relevant descrip-
tive tool. One could also imagine that algorithms make proposals as to which
decisions to make. However, there is a step more that can be taken. One might
20For a discussion of the notion of life-word, see Skovsmose (2009).
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imagine that the very decision about selling and buying is in fact made by a
mathematical algorithm. The Danish newspaper, Politiken, in its edition of the
24th of February 2010 contains an article, “Maskinen overtager den globale br-
shandel” (“The machine takes over the global stock market”) by Jeremy Grant
and Michael Mackenzie, whose point is exactly that the very decision-making
is placed in the hands of algorithms. Furthermore the newspaper contains an
article by Per Thiemann stating that 20% of the selling and buying at the
Copenhagen Stock Market is conducted by the computer. This is an example
of mathematics coming to be a direct part of the economic reality.
The overall implication of this is that the nature into which we are sub-
merged is of a mechanical format. Techno-nature is a complex mathematics-
based construction. Through mathematics in action, we are in fact bringing our
social, political, and economic environment deeper into a mechanical format.
5. Dissolution of Responsibility
An action may be associated with an acting subject, this being a person or
institution that conducts the action. Generally, the acting subject is held re-
sponsible for the action. This responsibility, however, can be questioned if the
acting subject might have been forced to perform the action, or if they had
been unaware of the full range of implications of the action.
However, mathematics-based actions often appear to be missing an acting
subject. As a consequence, mathematics-based actions easily appear to be con-
ducted in an ethical vacuum. As an illustration, one could think of automatic
selling-buying decisions made at the stock market, as referred to previously.
Such decisions are merged into automated clusters of decisions, and large quan-
tities of such clusters have implications far beyond what is normally expected.
It is in fact possible to relate features of the world-wide economic crisis to such
mathematics-based avalanches of decisions. But who could be held responsible?
Somehow responsibility seems to dissolve.
An example of such a possible dissolution of responsibility is presented by
Mario Snchez (2009, 2010) in his discussion of a “marginalisation index”. This
index has been applied in a Mexican context in trying to invent measures for the
degree of marginalisation which certain communities might suffer. Naturally,
there can be many different ways of measuring marginalisation, but whatever
modelling is applied, some parameters have to be introduced and related, and
some standards have to be introduced so that the entire social, political and
economic processes of marginalisation emerge in a modelled format. Here may
occur an extreme form of primary-secondary ranking, where the experienced
characteristics of marginalisation are “abstracted away”, in favour of only con-
centrating on quantitative and “mechanical” features of marginalisation. On
this basis political action might be taken, or not taken. Such an approach has
many implications, one of which might be that new criteria are formulated and
claimed to be “objective”.
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It might be claimed that mathematics helps to establish objectivity in calcu-
lations and that mathematics-based actions are well-considered and represent
the optimal course to be taken. However, mathematics might also introduce
a certain amount of arbitrariness into the decision-making process, as can be
illustrated by the “cynical equations”. Arbitrariness might be covered by an
overwhelming mass of formal calculations and formalities that may endow the
result with a perceived necessity, although a subjective and impart necessity.
This impartation draws on the whole metaphysics that accompanies mathe-
matics. It does so by imposing a mechanical world view. This also applies to
the mathematical marginalisation model. Through the impartation of necessity,
elimination of responsibility becomes part of mathematics in action.
6. Symbolic Power, Beyond Good and Evil?
The duality between good and evil is deep-rooted in many philosophical dis-
courses. But when we consider the symbolic power associated with mathemat-
ics, it might be relevant to try to step outside the good-evil duality. Symbolic
power opens a space for technological enterprises that can be problematic, un-
fair, blind, helpful, ruthless, benevolent, productive, risky, innovative, etc. Such
qualities cannot be described along a good-evil axis.
It could well be that mathematics imposes much on the domain it is assumed
to describe. Mathematics can impose priorities concerning what is primary and
what to relegate as secondary. Mathematics can become part of action by form-
ing conceptions about what can be constructed, designed and accomplished. It
can structure the as-if reasoning through which the viability of an action is ad-
dressed. It can provide patterns for justification and legitimation. It can come to
make part of reality as an integral part of what has been implemented. Finally,
mathematics in action might miss an “acting subject” and let responsibility
dissolve. However, we cannot assume that we are in a position to provide any
straightforward evaluation of such features of symbolic power.
My conclusion is not to try to eliminate or to obstruct the symbolic power
that might be rooted in mathematics. Thus there is no point in claiming that
the distinctions between appearance and reality and between sense and ref-
erence are “bad” distinctions, nor can they be claimed to be “good”. They
are distinctions that may facilitate powerful symbolic actions. My point is to
address this power explicitly, and to try to identify its possible dimensions.
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mentales en el desarrollo de profesores en servicio. Educación Matemática, 21(3),
163–172.
[21] Sánchez, M. (2010). Gobierno y matemáticas. La Jornada. http://bit.ly/9Kgkrz
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